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AnMm.ALTY-lNJURY To LONGSHOREMAN WoRKING AsHoRE BY UNSEAWORTHINESS OF THE VESSEL-Plaintiff, employed by an independent contractor
to lade defendant's ship, was injured by a "pontoon" hatch cover which fell on
his foot while he was working on the dock beside the ship. The court below
found that defendant was not negligent, but that the ship was unseaworthy and
that its unseaworthiness caused plaintiff's injury. Held, judgment for plaintiff
affirmed. Breach of the warranty of seaworthiness is a tort arising out of a marl-
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time status or relation and is therefore cognizable by maritime law whether occurring at sea or on land; a longshoreman employed by an independent contractor to lade a vessel has the status requisite to the creation of the obligation.
Strika -v. Netherlands Ministry of Traffic, (2d Cir, 1950) 185 F. (2d) 555, 50

A.M.C. 1354.1
Since the Supreme Court's decision in The Osceola2 in 1903, the general rule
that "the vessel and her owner are ..• liable [in admiralty] to an indemnity for
injuries received by seamen in consequence of the unseaworthiness of the ship"3
has been accepted in the United States,4 and litigation in this area has centered
on the problems of defining and qualifying the terms "unseaworthiness"5 and
'·seamen."6 The principal case falls into the latter category and represents an
extension of the doctrine of the recent controversial Supreme Court decision,
Seas Shipping Co. -v. Sieracki,7 in which liability without fault was imposed on
a shipowner for injuries suffered by an independently employed longshoreman
working on board as a result of the unseaworthiness of the ship, to similar injuries suffered on land. As companion pieces, the two cases are symmetric and
complementary;8 the inconsistencies. and anomolies inherent in the principal
decision were created by Sieracki and are apparent only when these cases are
viewed in the context of prior decisions and general admiralty law in this area. 9
Up to the time of the Sieracki case it had been assumed that the doctrine of
unseaworthiness applied only to "seamen" in the literal sea-going sense10 and
that land workers employed, either directly or by contract -with an intermediary
in the service of the ship, were invitees to whom the duty owed was that of due
care under the generally accepted doctrines of tort law.11 The first inkling of
1 Majority opinion by L. Hand, C.J.; dissent by Swan, J., on the basis that extension
of the novel doctrine of Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872 (1946),
should come only from the Supreme Court.
2 189 U.S. 158, 23 S.Ct. 483 (1903).
S!d. at 175.
4 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96, 64 S.Ct. 455 (1944); Rainey v. New
York and P.S.S. Co., (9th Cir. 1914) 216 F. 449, cert. den. 235 U.S. 704, 35 S.Ct. 209
(1914).
6 See Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., supra note 4; ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 303-307
(1939).
6 See ROBINSON, Al>l\mtALTY 279-282 (1939).
7 328 U.S. 85, 66 S.Ct. 872 (1946).
8 The result of the principal case has been favored on the basis of the Sieracki case
by writers otherwise opposed to the e."'<istence and extension of that decision; 57 YALE L.J.
243 (1947); 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1946); see also, 19 TEMPLE L.Q. 336 (1946).
Nevertheless, it is anomalous ·that the decision in the principal case came before any case
extending the unseaworthiness remedy to a "bona fide seaman" injured on land; see principal case at p. 558.
9 For criticism of Sieracki, see 59 HARv. L. REv. 127 (1945); 45 CoL. L. REv. 957
(1945); 19 TEMPLE L.Q. 339 (1945); 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1946); 57 YALE L. REv.
243 (1947); Dickinson and Andrews, "A Decade of Admiralty in the Supreme Court of
the United States," 36 CALIF. L. REv. 169 (1948); 18 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 110 (1949).
10 See note 23 infra.
11 Panama Mail Steamship Co. v. Davis, (3d Cir. 1935) 79 F. (2d) 430; Bryant v.
Vestland, (5th Cir. 1931) 52 F. (2d) 1078; The Howell, (2d Cir. 1921) 273 F. 513; The
Student, (4th Cir. 1917) 243 F. 807; see citations collected in 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601 at
602, n. 6 (1946).
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the possibility that longshoremen could be considered seamen for some purposes
was contained in International Stevedoring Co. v. Haverty, 12 which extended
the benefits of the Jones Act13 to longshoremen injured on shipboard,14 a decision twice affirmed by the Court after the passage of the Longshoreman's and
Harbor Worker's Act 15 Nevertheless the doctrine fell into disuse and it was
assumed that that act, providing an exclusive re~edy to maritime workers other
than the officers and crew of a vessel, had effectively overruled Haverty. 16
Swanson v. Marra Brothers,11 decided on the same day as Sieracki, refused to
extend Jones Act benefits to a longshoreman injured on land, though recognizing that the act applied to "seamen" so injured,18 and seems to assume that the
Haverty result had been disapproved and avoided by the passage of the Longshoreman's Act.19 But the act provides an exclusive remedy only against employers, for the rights of maritime workers as against third parties are expressly
reserved. This reservation left the court free to grant recovery in Sieracki when
the plaintiff could have recovered only under the Longshoreman's Act had he
been employed by the defendant shipowner.20 The duty to seamen imposed by
12 272 U.S. 50, 47 S.Ct. 19 (1926).
1341 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. 688. The act gives "seamen" injured "in the
course of ••• employment" a cause of action based on negligence and enforceable at law and
with a jury trial.
14 The decision represented a substantial benefit to longshoremen, since no other federally-created statutory remedy existed at that time, and maritime workers injured on navigable waters were precluded from compensation under state acts by the doctrine of Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 37 S.Ct. 524 (1917).
15 Jamison v. Encarnacion, 281 U.S. 635, 50 S.Ct. 440 (1930); Uravic v. F. Jarka
Co., 282 U.S. 234, 51 S.Ct. 111 (1931).
10 Nogueira v. New York, N.H. and H. R. Co., 281 U.S. 128, 50 S.Ct. 303 (1930);
ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 322-324 (1939).
11 328 U.S. 1, 66 S.Ct. 869 (1946).
1s O'Donnell v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36, 66 S.Ct. 488 (1943);
2 NACCA L.J. 152 (1948).
19 "The effect of ••• the Longshoremen's Act is to confine the benefits of the Jones
Act to the members of the crew of a vessel plying in navigable waters and to substitute for
the right to recovery recognized by the Haverty case only such rights to compensation as are
given by the Longshoremen's Act." Swanson v. Marra Brothers, supra note 17 at 7. It has
been assumed that the Haverty result would not be obtained in a case of injury on navigable waters under the authority of the Swanson case and the principal case seems to concur
on this point. See 45 CoL. L. REv. 957 (1945); 34 CALIF. L. REv. 605 (1946); Allen v.
Maryland Drydock Co., (Superior Ct. of Baltimore 1949) 1949 A.M.C. 527, noted 18
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 110 (1949), note 28 infra. However, many of the cases assume that
the Swanson case drew a distinction between on land and on water [see Connor v. United
States, (D.C. Pa. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 847; 57 YALE L.J. 243 (1947)], although the principal case, while not dealing e,.,.-pressly with this problem, indicates that the effect of the
I.ongshoremen's Act on the Haverty result was more in the nature of estoppel than of
repeal. It should be noted that the definition of the term "seamen" as used in the Jones
Act is a matter of congressional intent and is not necessarily controlling when considering
the meaning of "seamen" under general admiralty law, especially in view of the fact that
Jones Act remedies are. available only when the relation of employer and employee exists:
Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. v. McAllister, 337 U.S. 783, 69 S.Ct. 1317 (1949); Loraine
v. Coastwise Lines, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 336.
20 The extension of the doctrine of unseaworthiness is of pecuniary value to the longshoreman; although a jury trial is not available, recovery _under the admiralty action will
almost always be greater than the fixed compensation provided by statute. Bean, "Choice
of Remedies by Injured Maritime Workers," 1 NAcCA L.J. 74 (1948).
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the unseaworthiness doctrine had long been supposed to exist by virtue of status
rather than contract;21 that it applied to men not directly employed by the ship
.was not in itself novel or unexpected. The incongruity of the decision, as was
forcefully indicated in the dissenting opinion of the court's only admiralty expert, the late Chief Justice Stone, is found in its application of the unseaworthiness doctrine to a class of workers for whom the reason of the rule does not
exist.22 The peculiar remedies available to a seaman under admiralty law were
developed as compensation for the hazards to which the seaman was exposed
by the nature and locus of his work, his complete dependence on the ship for
his safety at sea, and his removal for long periods ljom the norm of human
living. 23 The liberality of the courts in allowing these remedies in virtually
every case in which these risks are shared is laudable;.24 the extension of the
term to include anyone doing a seaman's work without considering the rule's
raison d'etre has produced a precedent the effects of which are unpredictable because not circumscribed by logic or necessity.25 The rationale of Hand's analysis
21 On this point the·reasoning of the Sieracki case is persuasive. Cases actually extending the indemnity to seamen not directly employed by the vessel owner are no;nexistent
because it is not customary for seamen who go to sea to be employed by a third party, but
it cannnot be supposed that the doctrine would not have developed had it been the custom
for seamen to be employed by a shore organization in the business of manning ships.
22See 16 GBo. WASH. L. RBv. 523 (1948) in which it is suggested that the reason for
giving any special remedies to seamen no longer exists.
23 Seamen are traditionally regarded as "wards of the admiralty." Robertson v. Bald.win, 165 U.S. 275, 17 S.Ct. 326 (1897); Bainbridge v. Merchant and Miners Transportation Co., 287 U.S. 278, 53 S.Ct. 159 (1932); The Arizona v. Anelich, 298 U.S. 110, 56
S.Ct. 707 (1936); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Smith, 305 U.S. 424, 59 S.Ct. 262 (1939);
Aguilar v. Standard Oil Co., 318 U.S. 724, 63 S.Ct. 930 (1943).
24 Examples are listed by RoBINSON, ADMIRALTY 279-282 (1939).
25 The result of the principal case was expected by writers because of the relational
nature of the unseaworthiness concept, which would exclude any distinction based on the
locality of the injury (see note 7 supra) although two federal cases decided since the
Sieracki case have reached a result contrary to the principal case. The first, Anderson v.
Lorentzen, (2d Cir. 1947) 160 F. (2d) 173, involved a suit by fourteen longshoremen, all
of whom were injured because of the unseaworthiness of the vessel. Recovery was denied
to eight of the plaintiffs who were on land at the time of injury, but extended to the
remaining six who were on the vessel. In a concurring opinion Judge Chase explained the
apparent inconsistency on the basis that "their [the unsuccessful plaintiffs'] relationship
to the defendants was not legally the same"; damages awarded the remaining six were
sustained merely by citing Sieracki. The second case, Connor v. United States, (D.C. Pa.
1949) 87 F. Supp. 847, was decided on the basis that no "maritime tort" was involved when
the injury took place on land. Courts have been wary of extending the doctrine to workers
other than stevedores or longshoremen engaged in loading a vessel. In Lynch v. United
States, (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 97, Hand states that "Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki,
covers stevedores, but the employees of a contractor still remain [business guests] ••• and
are not entitled to a seaworthy ship••••" And again in Guerrini v. United States, (2d
Cir. 1948) 157 F. (2d) 352, in denying recovery to an employee of an independent contractor engaged in cleaning the ship's tanks and boilers, he explained, "It is impossible to
be sure how far the new doctrine may go, for everything done on board a ship contributes
to her 'service,' if it helps to make and keep her ready for her work. • • • Yet we should
hesitate to read the decision as intended to extend the protection of what amounts to a
warranty of seaworthiness to all workmen upon a ship, however casual their presence there,
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in the principal case is found in three propositions: (I) the result of the Swanson case was dictated by Congress in the Longshoreman's Act but does not apply
to the principal case because of the reservation of suits against third parties
found in that act; (2) the application of the unseaworthiness liability to a shipowner who is not the employer of the injured person implies that seaworthiness
is a warranty the breach of which is a tort, 26 not a consensual liability imposed
"in invitum as a consequence of making the contract regardless of the warrantor's
intent"; 27 (3) the nature of the liability being found in a maritime status, it is
applicable to a seaman injured on land and therefore, by authority of the Sieracki
decision, to a longshoreman in the same position.28 As it stands, the reasoning
of the case is logical; its fault is one of omission; the opinion ignores policy considerations almost completely. 29 In so doing it has provided further influential
authority for allowing longshoremen greater remedies than are available to simiand however much their relation to the employer is unlike the early paternalistic status of
master and crew, many of whose features have vestigially persisted to the present time."
Accord: Fine v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1946) 66 F. Supp. 768; Armento v. United
States, (D.C. N.Y. 1947) 74 F. Supp. 198; Peterson v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1947)
80 F. Supp. 84; Meyers v. Pittsburgh S.S. Co., (6th Cir. 1948) 165 F. (2d) 642; Cioffi
v. New Zealand Shipping Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1948) 80 F. Supp. 98; O'Connell v. Naess, (2d
Cir. 1949) 176 F. (2d) 138. But see Bow v. Pilato, (D.C. Cal. 1949) 82 F. Supp. 399,
and Sulovitz v. United States, (D.C. Pa. 1945) 64 F. Supp. 637, which suggest the development of a contrary body of authority outside of the second circuit. The Sieracki decision
itself has been favorably accepted in the lower federal courts, Landgraf v. United States,
(D.C. Pa. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 58; Lauro v. United States, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 32;
Bruszewski v. Isthmian S.S. Co., (3d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 720; Lo Bue v. United States,
(D.C. N.Y. 1947) 75 F. Supp. 154; Shelton v. Seas Shipping Co., (D.C. Pa. 1947) 75 F.
Supp. 195; Moragnel v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., (D.C. Md. 1948) 75 F. Supp.
969; Eagle Indemnity Co. v. United States Lines Co., (D.C. Md. 1949) 86 F. Supp. 949;
controversy has arisen on the problem of assessing the liability as between owner and
charterer, Vitozi v. Balboa Shipping Co., (2d Cir. 1947) 163 F. (2d) 286; Cannella v.
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., (2d Cir. 1949) 174 F. (2d) 794, noted 63 HARv. L. REv. 345
(1949); 26 TEx. L. REv. 517 (1948).
26 The conclusion that the unseaworthiness doctrine was a tort action prevented recovery for an injury suffered by a longshoreman on land in Connor v. United States. Before
the passage of the Shipping Act of 1948, 62 Stat. L. 496, 46 U.S.C. (Supp. III, 1950)
§740, the admiralty jurisdiction did not extend to torts consummated on land. Hand deals
with this problem in the principal case and concludes that the "relational" nature of the
unseaworthiness makes it independent of the locality of the injury, thereby effectively
vitiating his tort analysis.
27 Principal case at 558.
28 This reasoning, if consistent, must assume that Swanson v. Marra Brothers, supra
note 16, applies to injuries on water as well as on land.
20 See Stone's dissenting opinion in the Sieracki case. The court ignores the fact that
both in admiralty and at common law liability without fault has been imposed only in
situations of great danger or risk; in ordinary situations liability is determined on the basis
of fault. The modern approach is to impose limited liability without fault on the employer
in personal injury cases on the theory that it should be treated as an operating cost, and
Congress has expressed its intention of dealing with the problems of longshoremen in this
manner; workman's compensation was not conceived as a substitute for actions against third
parties based on negligence, but to allow two distinct imputations of absolute liability is to
duplicate remedies. See 45 CoL. L. REv. 957 (1945).
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larly situated seamen (in the traditional sense),30 has added to the weight of
a regrettable decision by giving it the sanction of a great judge, and has given
to lesser courts a broad rationale with which to justify further extensions of the
unseaworthiness doctrine from the miasmic premise of the Sieracki case. 31

Jean Engstrom, S.Ed.

3 0 "Seamen" must elect between an action under the Jones Act and an action for
unseaworthiness, Plamals v. The Penar del Rio, 277 U.S. 151, 48 S.Ct. 457 (1928); a
longshoreman can collect compensation and then proceed against the ship owner for unseaworthiness: Bretsky v. Lehigh Valley R.R., (2d Cir. 1946) 156 F. (2d) 594; Gahagan
Construction Co. v. Armao, (1st Cir. 1948) 165 F. · (2d) 301; Bean, "Choice of Remedies
by Injured Maritime Workers," 1 NACCA L.J. 74 (1948).
31 Another problem is the possible, though unlikely, extension of the doctrine to the
admiralty remedy of maintenance and cure: 34 CALIF. L. REv. 601 (1946); 26 TEx. L. REv.
517 (1948); 29 TEX. L. REv. 367 (1950). See the easy derivation of the formula, "Unseaworthiness-Liability" in 57 YALE L. REv. 243 (1947). The tort analysis, even more than
the test of doing a seaman's work promulgated in Sieracki, indicates the possibility that the
doctrine will be extended to include all those formerly classed as invitees.

